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The State of Ohio in M89o passed a law (Rev. Stat., Ohio, i89o, § 3320)
requiring all railroad companies operating trains within the State to cause
three of its regular trains, if so many are run, each way, to stop at a town or
city having three thousand inhabitants or over, to receive and discharge
passengers, and provided a penalty for failure to do so. In an action in that
State to recover the penalty under the statute, the law was held constitutional
and verdict given against the railroad. The Supreme Court of the United
States has recently reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the State
court (Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. State of Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, ig Sup.
Ct. Rep. 465), holding that such an act properly came within the police
power of the State-that the power of the State in this respect applies not
only to the health, morals, and safety of the public, but also to whatever
promotes the public peace, comfort and convenience, and that the Act is a
valid exercise of such power and applies to an interstate railroad incorpo-
rated by and operating through such State, the federal government not
having taken any affirmative action on the subject, under its power to regu-
late interstate commerce. The court was not without considerable difficulty
in reaching this decision, but it seems to be reasonable and just. The court
cited and approved Hennington v. Georgia (163 U. S. 299; i6 Sup. Ct. io86),
where an act prohibiting the running of freight trains on Sunday was upheld
as constitutional. To the objection raised that the police power of the State
is restricted to regulations'pertaining to the health, morals and safety of the
public, and does not extend to matters pertaining to public convenience, the
court, after citing numerous cases, said: "Now, it is evident that these cases
had no reference to the health, morals or safety of the people of the State.
but only to the public convenience. They recognized the fundamental prin-
ciple that, outside of the field directly occupied by the general government
under the powers granted to it by the Constitution, all questions arising
within a State that relate to its internal order, or that involve the public
convenience or the general good, are primarily for the determination of the
State, and that its legislative enactments relating to those subjects, and
which are not inconsistent with the State Constitution, are to be respected
and enforced in the courts of the Union, if they do not by their operation
directly entrench upon the authority of the United States, or violate some
right protected by the national Constitution. The power here referred to
is-to use the words of Chief Justice Shaw-the power 'to make, ordain and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitu-
tion, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the common-
wealth and of the subjects of the same' (Com. v. Alger, 7 Cash. 53, 85). * * *
It may be that such legislation is not within the 'police power' of a State, as
those words have been sometimes, though inaccurately, used. But in our
opinion, the power, whether called 'police,' 'governmental' or 'legislative,'
exists in each State, by appropriate enactments not forbidden by its own
Constitution or by the Constitution of the United States, -to regulate the
relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its jurisdic-
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tion, and therefore to provide for the public convenience and public good.
This power in the State is entirely distinct from any power granted to the
general government, although, when exercised, it may sometimes reach
subjects over which national legislation can be constitutionally extended.
When Congress acts with reference to a matter confided to it by the Consti-
tution, then its statutes displace all conflicting local regulations touching
that matter, although such regulations may have been established in pursu-
ance of a power not surrendered by the State to the general government.
(Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I, 2io; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243;
Railway Co. v. Haber, I69 U. S. 613, 626, x8 Sup. Ct. 488)." Upon the sug-
gestion that the conclusion reached was not in accord with previous de-
cisions on the point, the ,court reverted to Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485;
Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, ii8 U. S. 556, of Sup. Ct. 4, and
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. i42, 16 Sup. Ct. io96, cases where
certain State enactments were adjudged to be inconsistent with the grant of
power to Congress to regulate commerce among the States, and discussed
and distinguished them. Mr. Justice Shiras (with whom concurred Justice
Brewer, White and Peckham) delivered a vigorous dissenting opinion, re-
viewing and discussing the cases at length, and strongly intimated that the
majority failed to distinguish the present case from some others on the point,
particularly Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, supra, where an act, the effect of
which would have been to compel an interstate train to deviate from its
direct route to a small town and receive and discharge passengers before
proceeding upon its course, to be unconstitutional and void as an unauthor-
ized interference with interstate commerce.
In re Curtis et al., 91 Fed. 737, involves the question of the effect of the
passage of the national bankruptcy act on State insolvency laws. The facts
of the case were these: Certain copartners made an assignment under the
Illinois statute, and certain creditors filed claims in accordance with the pro-
visions of the statute. This was in August, 1898. November I, 1898, which
was the first day when such action could be taken, creditors of the copart-
nership brought proceedings to have the partnership adjudged bankrupt,
alleging the assignment as an act of bankruptcy. The debtors angwered,
admitting the act of bankruptcy, but alleging an estoppel against such cred-
itors as had filed their claims under the assignment. The court citing Aanu-
facturing Co. v. Hamilton, 5r N. E. 529 (Mass.), In re Bruss-Ritter Co., go Fed.
651, and In re Rouse, Hazard &- Co., 91 Fed. 96, held, that the proceedings
in the State court were absolutely void and that no estoppel could arise, as
the national bankruptcy law suspended the operation of all the State insol-
vency laws. This is the opinion of nearly all the text writers-Brandenburg
on Bankruptcy, 458-9; Collier on Bankruptcy, 428-30; Bush on Bankruptcy,
408-9; Black on Bankruptcy, 271; Bump on Bankruptcy, uth ed., 96-7; but
see pp. 98-roz. The Connecticut Probate Courts are, however, still taking
jurisdiction of assignments for the benefit of creditors under the Connecticut
laws, and in at least one case have taken jurisdiction of a suit in involuntary
insolvency. Eminent Connecticut judges and lawyers believe that the State
law affecting this subject is not superseded by the National Bankruptcy Law
of July 1, i898, and that proceedings thereunder can be maintained in' the
State courts at least so long as there are no proceedings in the same matter
in the Federal courts. They rely bn the cases of Hawkins' Appeal, 34 Conn.
548; Shepardson's Appeal, 36 Conn. 23; Maltbie v. Hotchkiss, 38 Conn. 80, and
Geery's Appeal, 43 Conn. 289. Construing the United States Bankruptcy Act
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of z867. To the same effect as to the law of 1841, Core ex parte Ziegenfuss z
]red. Law, (N. C.) 463. Strong v. Carrier, i7 Conn. 319, 331 (as to an
assignment before the bankruptcy law was in force, which was not acted
on until the law no longer had any effect). The reasoning of the court in
Geery's Appeal is that while, if the State law comes into practical conflict
with the United States law, the latter must prevail, voluntary insolvency
proceedings under the State law are permissible so long as there are no pro-
ceedings in the Federal court, and involuntary proceedings so long as the
insolvent has committed no act of bankruptcy under the United States
laws, and declines to go into bankruptcy. This last is true because such
a situation is not provided for by the United States law, therefore the
State law may regulate it. Maltbie v. Hotchkiss holds that the chief purpose
of the insolvency laws is to regulAte the distributing of assets among cred-
itors, while a bankruptcy law also discharges the debtor. Hawkins' Appeal
holds a voluntary insolvency proceeding valid because it would be valid at
common law for the debtor to assign his property, and the State law merely
regulates this, which it was probably not the intention of Congress to repeal.
All admit that when the United States courts step in, their authority is para-
mount. Davis v. Bohle et al., i Nat. Bankruptcy News 216, affirming the
decision of Judge Adams in In re Sievers, 91 Fed. 368. Judge Adams reasons
somewhat along the lines of the Connecticut lawyers. He says in part:
"It appears to me that there is a substantial difference between a pro-
ceeding under a general insolvency statute and one under a'statute permit-
ting general assignments. The one administers upon the estate of an in-
solvent as a proceeding in the courts, derives its potency from the law,
winds up the estate judicially and discharges the debtor. Such is essentially
a proceeding in bankruptcy, and is undoubtedly superseded by the act of
Congress. * * * This conclusion is supported not only by ample author-
ity, but by negative implication from the last clause of the act of July I, 1898,
which provides that "Proceedings commenced under State insolvency laws
before the passage of the act shall not be affected by," etc. The other derives
its potency not from the law, but from the contract or deed of the debtor, is
administered under and according to the provisions of the deed, supple-
mented only by salutory legislative safeguards, and does not result in a
discharge of the debtor from his obligations. This method of proceeding
is not superseded by the act of Congress in question. Mayer v. Hellman, 91
N. S. 496; Boese v. King, 1o8 U. S. 379, 2 Sup. Ct. 765; Reed v. McIntyre, 08
U. S. 507." To somewhat the same effect is State ex rel. Strohl v. Superior
Court of King County et al., 56 Pac. 35, which holds that until an insolvent cor-
poration within a State is adjudged a bankrupt under the Federal law, the
right of the State court to appoint a receiver under the State law is not
suspended. How far the reasoning of the court in Geery's Appeal may be
affected by the difference between the act of I898, the act of 1867, and by
the negative inference from the last clause of the act of 1898, is problematical.
One great difference between the act of 1898, the act of 1867, which is im-
portant in this connection, is that while in under the old law a general
assignment for -the benefit of creditors was only evidence of an act -of bank-
ruptcy, made so by judicial construction, under the statute of 1898 it is an
act of bankruptcy. It seems probable that under the present law the Courts
of Probate in Connecticut will continue to take jurisdiction of both voluntary
and involuntary actions in insolvency until there is a decision to the con-
trary by the Supreme Court of Connecticut or by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
